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INTRODUCTION
Should it be defamatory to falsely call someone a lawyer?
Plenty of people hate lawyers (in the abstract, at least). Hurling the
false epithet “lawyer” could cause people to back away, to shun the
individual, to walk in the other direction. Real damage may be
done by that single, erroneous characterization.
Or consider for a moment what a member of Tony Soprano’s
crew might lose if someone falsely accuses him of being a
government informant. Certainly, for the falsely accused here, a
damaged reputation would be the least of his worries. But as with
the stigmatized “lawyer,” would the besmirched mafioso actually
succeed in a defamation claim?
Not likely. While lawyers are loathed by some and stool
pigeons reviled by others, in mainstream society neither draws
general disapprobation. Lawyer and tattletale jokes aside, the acts
of lawyering and cooperating with police are not, to a reasonable
person, shun-worthy.
Why, then, do some courts continue to hold that a false
statement that an individual is gay is defamatory?1 Even more,
why do other courts still view this characterization as defamatory
per se (i.e., the statement is defamatory on its face and damages are
simply presumed)?2 What are the policy implications of these
decisions on the direction of our society? Is it fair to simply write
off these rulings as homophobic?
This Article will attempt to shed some light on the tangled
combination of the descriptive and the normative bases on which
courts find defamatory meaning. It will first explore some of the
intricacies of identifying defamatory statements in libel law,
including the slander per se categories that have been imported into
libel in many jurisdictions. Next, this Article examines a range of
cases in which the central question was whether a false statement
1
See Q-Tone Broad., Co. v. Musicradio of Md., No. 93C-09-021, 1994 Del. Super.
LEXIS 453, at *14 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 22, 1994) (citing Schomer v. Smidt, 170 Cal.
Rptr. 662, 664 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980)).
2
See Mangle v. City of New Orleans Dep’t of Police, 673 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1982)
(affirming lower court’s decision and holding that falsely calling someone gay was per se
defamatory).
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that the plaintiff was gay was defamatory. These decisions present
a wide range of opinions, with some recent cases questioning
whether an allegation of homosexuality should ever be construed
as defamatory.3 Finally, the Article analyzes the current state of
the law and suggests an alternate approach to this important area of
defamation doctrine. We offer a proposal that suggests courts
decline to find defamatory meaning not only in statements
involving imputations of homosexuality, but in other statements
concerning an immutable characteristic or involuntary state where
a finding of defamation would tend to stigmatize or promote
discrimination against that class of persons.
I. IDENTIFYING DEFAMATORY STATEMENTS
Proving defamation in United States courts has become an
increasingly complicated undertaking. Along with a substratum of
common law requirements, the U.S. Supreme Court has imposed a
number of additional layers of First Amendment firmament,
beginning with the landmark case New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan.4
Additional requirements flowing from state
constitutional free speech and press protections have also made
their way into the defamation laws of individual states.
Although the basic elements of libel vary somewhat from state
to state, a number of consistent patterns emerge. The Restatement
(Second) of Torts offers the following summary of the elements of

3

See Hayes v. Smith, 832 P.2d 1022, 1025 (Colo. App. 1991).
376 U.S. 254 (1964). In Sullivan, the Court considered “the extent to which the
constitutional protections for speech and press limit a State’s power to award damages in
a libel action brought by a public official against critics of his official conduct.” Id. at
256. At issue was a paid editorial advertisement, published by The New York Times,
which contained several misstatements of fact regarding a civil rights protest in
Montgomery, Alabama. Id. Respondent, Sullivan, one of three elected commissioners of
Montgomery, sued the Times, alleging that he had been libeled by the advertisement. Id.
Reasoning that “erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate, and that it must be
protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the breathing space that they need . . .
to survive,” id. at 271 (internal quotation marks omitted) the Court held that the First
Amendment requires “a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering
damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that
the statement was made with ‘actual malice’—that is, with knowledge that it was false or
with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.” Id. at 279.
4
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libel: “(a) a false and defamatory statement concerning another; (b)
an unprivileged publication to a third party; (c) fault amounting at
least to negligence on the part of the publisher; and (d) either
actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm, or the
existence of special harm caused by the publication.”5
The last element—the issue of special damages—deserves a
brief discussion since it connects with an ongoing conflict in the
law in cases involving imputations of homosexuality. Most U.S.
jurisdictions follow a rule that makes libel without special damages
actionable only if its defamatory meaning is clear on the face of the
statement—that is, “libel per se.”6 For statements without such
patent defamatory meaning (“libel per quod”), the claim requires
proof of special damages—actual economic or pecuniary loss.7
These damages can be difficult to prove, and their absence creates
a barrier to recovery. A per se finding may also mean that “the
plaintiff need not prove the statements were defamatory within the
context in which they were made.”8 A further wrinkle is that a
number of jurisdictions have now imported into libel law four
categories of statements from the law of slander that also are
actionable without special damages (drawn from the concept of
slander per se, not to be confused with libel per se)9: (1)
accusations of crimes; (2) imputation of a loathsome disease; (3)
imputations affecting the plaintiff in his or her business or
profession; and (4) imputations of unchastity.10 A number of cases
involving sexual orientation have applied both the first and fourth
categories to allegations that the plaintiff is gay.
5

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1977).
ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION § 2.8.3 (1999).
7
See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1973).
8
Smith, 832 P.2d at 1024.
9
The per se/per quod damage distinction stems from the difference in the lasting
effects of libel, which generally only requires proof of actual damages, versus the more
fleeting nature of slander, treated as per quod and for which some jurisdictions require a
showing of special damages. See Charles T. McCormick, The Measure of Damages for
Defamation, 12 N.C. L. REV. 120, 121–22 (1934). Some states have eliminated the
distinction entirely, requiring all plaintiffs meeting the basic defamation elements to
prove damages of some kind. Moreover, these slander per se categories may be applied
both in slander cases and in libel cases. Courts sometimes confuse this issue by using the
term “defamation per se,” but this does little to clarify which concept is being applied.
10
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 570, 571–73 (1977).
6
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Determining whether a statement is capable of defamatory
meaning is generally the province of a judge in the first instance
rather than that of a jury. The standard by which this generally is
done incorporates both descriptive and normative elements. The
Restatement (Second) of Torts states the majority rule that a
“communication is defamatory if it tends so to harm the reputation
of another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to
deter third persons from associating or dealing with him.”11 In a
comment to that section, the Restatement notes that the
determination of the “community” in question is not based on the
notion of a simple majority vote, but is instead determined by
whether the communication would prejudice the person in the eyes
of “a substantial and respectable minority” of the community.12 If
only a small group of persons would view the statement as
defamatory, the Restatement notes, that would be legally
insufficient. Moreover, “[t]he fact that a communication tends to
prejudice another in the eyes of even a substantial group is not
enough if the group is one whose standards are so anti-social that it
is not proper for the courts to recognize them.”13
Thus, the judge in a defamation case is required to determine
how a “substantial and respectable minority” of the community
would react to the statement in question, and whether that reaction
would tend to harm the plaintiff. As Professor Lyrissa Lidsky
astutely noted, the nature of
[t]he determination of who constitutes a substantial
and respectable minority often hinges on what the
judge presumes the community’s values are. In
effect, liability is often based on the judge’s own
knowledge and experience rather than on the
11

Id. § 559.
Under defamation law, the “community” can be geographic, social, or even topical.
See, e.g., Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Rapp, 997 So. 2d 1098, 1100 (Fla. 2008) (holding that a
communication is defamatory if it prejudices the plaintiff in the eyes of a “substantial and
respectable minority of the community”); see also Matthew D. Bunker & Charles D.
Tobin, Pervasive Public Figure Status and Local or Topical Fame in Light of Evolving
Media Audiences, 75 JOURNALISM & MASS COMM. Q. 112 (1998) (arguing that the shift in
media and audience fragmentation making it easier to reach more discrete communities
warrants an expansion in the public figure doctrine).
13
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977).
12
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community’s actual beliefs. The “substantial and
respectable minority” standard thus exemplifies
what Professor Richard Hiers has termed a
“cryptonormative” expression, that is, one that
camouflages normative judgments beneath its
“seemingly descriptive form.”14
This normative grounding of defamation law suggests, of
course, that as social norms evolve, formerly defamatory meanings
may cease to be recognized as such. Consider, for example,
defamation by racial misidentification. As Professor John C.
Watson has described these cases, it was not uncommon for
nineteenth and early twentieth century U.S. courts, particularly in
the South, to find that falsely identifying a white plaintiff as
African-American was defamatory.15 The earliest cases, Watson
suggests, seem to have relied on either injury to the plaintiff in his
business, or on “the loss of rights and the imposition of criminal
penalties that black people were subject to solely because of their
race.”16 This latter rationale tied the injury to the English common
law’s per se category based on imputing a serious crime to the
defamation plaintiff—in these cases, the crime simply was being
black. Later courts, Watson suggests, began to apply a community
standards approach to defamatory meaning equivalent to the
Restatement approach mentioned above, which resulted in an
analysis of racial misidentification based on the expected reaction
of whites to the individual misidentified.17
Ultimately, courts began to reject defamation claims based on
racial misidentification, acknowledging that while prejudices
persisted among segments of the population, the community in
general was now more enlightened. In a 1989 case, Thomason v.
Times-Journal, Inc.,18 a Georgia appellate court affirmed summary
14

Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Defamation, Reputation, and the Myth of Community, 71
WASH. L. REV. 1, 19 (1996) (quoting Richard H. Hiers, Normative Analysis in Judicial
Determination of Public Policy, 3 J.L. & RELIGION 77, 80 (1985)).
15
John C. Watson, Defamation by Racial Misidentification: A Study of the Social Tort,
4 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 77, 77–78 (2002); see also Jonathan D. Kahn, Controlling
Identity: Plessy, Privacy, and Racial Defamation, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 755, 759 (2005).
16
Watson, supra note 15, at 87.
17
Id. at 82, 84–85.
18
379 S.E.2d 551 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989).
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judgment for the publisher of a false obituary.19 Not only was the
white subject of the obituary still alive, but the obituary stated that
the memorial service had been held at a funeral home serving
primarily African-American clients.20 The appellate court ruled
that the law could not give its imprimatur to such a claim: “Private
biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot,
directly or indirectly, give them effect.”21 Moreover, the court
wrote, “mere ‘peculiarities of taste found in eccentric groups
cannot form the basis for a finding of libelous inferences.’”22
A. False Imputation of Homosexuality Under State Defamation
Law
As previously noted, under current libel doctrine, state law
resolves the question of whether the false imputation of
homosexuality possesses a defamatory meaning. The decisions
generally fall into three groups, and while the growing trend is
toward the acceptance of homosexuality in American society,
defamation case law remains mixed. Courts generally hold that:
(1) such statements are defamatory per se, and damages are
presumed, either because they imply a serious crime, unchastity, or
simply expose a plaintiff to public hatred, contempt or ridicule;23
(2) such statements are capable of defamatory meaning, but require
proof of damages, a subset of which require proof of “special
damages;”24 or (3) such statements are not capable of defamatory
19

Id. at 554.
Id. at 552–53.
21
Id. at 553 (quoting Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984)).
22
Id. (quoting Fairley v. Peekskill Star Corp., 445 N.Y.S.2d 156, 158 (App. Div.
1981)).
23
See, e.g., Burns v. Meyer, 175 F. Supp. 2d 1259, 1270 (D. Nev. 2001) (“If the
defamation tends to injure the plaintiff in his or her business or profession, it is deemed
defamation per se, and damages will be presumed.”); Murphy v. Pizarrio, No. 94 Civ.
0471(JFK), 1995 WL 565990, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 1995) (“Under New York law . .
. a published statement imputing homosexuality to another is still defamatory per se and
proof of special damages is not required.”).
24
See, e.g., Smith v. Mission Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 225 F. Supp. 2d 1293, 1303 (D.
Kan. 2002) (“In Kansas, damages to reputation are not presumed and must be proved
regardless of the type of libel or slander.”); Donovan v. Fiumara, 442 S.E.2d 572, 575
(N.C. Ct. App. 1994) (“Our courts have long recognized two actionable classes of oral
defamation: slander per se and slander per quod: That is, the false remarks in themselves
(per se) may form the basis of an action for damages, in which case both malice and
20
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meaning at all due to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in
Lawrence v. Texas,25 as well as the increasing acceptance of
homosexuality in contemporary society.26
B. Defamation Per Se—Imputing (Former) Crime of Sodomy
Under the traditional common law view, slander per se was
limited to defamatory statements that impute to another person: (1)
a criminal offense; (2) a loathsome disease; (3) conduct,
characteristics or a condition that is incompatible with his business,
trade or office; or (4) serious sexual misconduct.27 A number of
cases, particularly those decided twenty or more years ago, have
held that a statement that the plaintiff was gay fell within the
“serious crime” category of slander per se.28 As noted earlier, in
slander or libel cases in many jurisdictions, such a finding means
that the claim is actionable without proof of special damages.
For example, in Buck v. Savage,29 a 1959 Texas appellate court
affirmed a libel and slander judgment on the per se ground of
criminal conduct.30 The plaintiff, Eldon Savage, had been
employed as a pharmaceutical salesman for Lincoln Laboratories
and its president, Wallace A. Buck. In the course of an
employment dispute, Buck asserted that Savage was “‘queer’ on
Hickam, meaning an unnatural relationship between two men.”31
Other statements by Buck attacked Savage’s character and
honesty. The court held “words used in the case in issue were

damage are, as a matter of law, presumed; or the false utterance may be such as to sustain
an action only when causing some special damage (per quod), in which case both the
malice and the special damage must be alleged and proved.” (quoting Beane v. Weiman
Co., 168 S.E.2d 236, 237 (N.C. Ct. App. 1969))).
25
539 U.S. 558 (2003); see id. at 584 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“A State can of
course assign certain consequences to a violation of its criminal law. But the State cannot
single out one identifiable class of citizens for punishment that does not apply to
everyone else, with moral disapproval as the only asserted state interest for the law.”).
26
Lydia Saad, Americans’ Acceptance of Gay Relations Crosses 50% Threshold,
GALLUP (May 25, 2010), http://www.gallup.com/poll/135764/americans-acceptance-gayrelations-crosses-threshold.aspx.
27
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 570–74 (1977).
28
See, e.g., Buck v. Savage, 323 S.W.2d 363 (Tex. App. 1959).
29
323 S.W.2d 363 (Tex. App. 1959).
30
Id. at 376–77.
31
Id. at 367.
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slanderous per se because they did impute to [Savage] the
commission of the crime of sodomy which was then a penal
offense in Texas.”32
Of course, in 2003, the U.S. Supreme Court dramatically
altered the legal landscape of this “criminality” approach to slander
per se with its decision in Lawrence v. Texas.33 In Lawrence, the
Court struck down a Texas statute criminalizing homosexual
activity and thereby overruled Bowers v. Hardwick,34 a 1986 case
in which the court had upheld the constitutionality of laws
criminalizing sodomy.35
Justice Kennedy, writing for the
Lawrence majority, explained that the Georgia anti-sodomy statute
violated the right to privacy under the Due Process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, declaring a fundamental right for
consenting adults to engage in private sexual activity.36 Justice
Kennedy championed the “liberty” interest in the Due Process
clause, writing that the Court
began its substantive discussion in Bowers as
follows: “The issue presented is whether the Federal
Constitution confers a fundamental right upon
homosexuals to engage in sodomy and hence
invalidates the laws of the many States that still
32

Id. at 369. Other courts have applied defamation per se. See, e.g., Plumley v.
Landmark Chevrolet, Inc., 122 F.3d 308 (5th Cir. 1997); Murphy v. Pizarrio, No. 94 Civ.
0471(JFK), 1995 WL 565990 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 1995); Wetherby v. Retail Credit Co.,
201 A.2d 344 (Md. 1964); Veazy v. Blair, 72 S.E.2d 481 (Ga. Ct. App. 1952); see also
Thomas v. Bynum, No. 04-02-00036-CV, 2003 WL 553277 (Tex. App. Feb. 28, 2003);
Nacinovich v. Tullet & Tokyo Forex, Inc., 685 N.Y.S.2d 17 (App. Div. 1999);
Leyendecker & Assocs., Inc. v. Wechter, 683 S.W.2d 369 (Tex. 1984); Head v. Newton,
596 S.W.2d 209 (Tex. App. 1980); Mazart v. State, 441 N.Y.S.2d 600 (N.Y. Ct. Cl.
1981); Nowark v. Maguire, 255 N.Y.S.2d 318 (App. Div. 1964); Christy v. Stauffer
Publ’ns, Inc., 437 S.W.2d 814 (Tex. 1969).
33
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). In 1962, a New York trial court somewhat
presaged Lawrence when it suggested that a plaintiff’s allegation that he was labeled a
“homosexual” did not constitute slander per se. Stein v. Trager, 232 N.Y.S.2d 362, 364
(N.Y. Sup. Ct.). The court reasoned that because the New York criminal code failed to
disclose any specific crime in the phrase “homosexual,” the use of the phrase did not
constitute words charging a punishable crime and were therefore not slanderous per se.
Id.
34
478 U.S. 186 (1986).
35
See id. at 196.
36
See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (citation omitted).
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make such conduct illegal and have done so for a
very long time.” That statement, we now conclude,
discloses the Court’s own failure to appreciate the
extent of the liberty at stake. To say that the issue
in Bowers was simply the right to engage in certain
sexual conduct demeans the claim the individual put
forward, just as it would demean a married couple
were it to be said marriage is simply about the right
to have sexual intercourse.37
He further stated: “When sexuality finds overt expression in
intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one
element in a personal bond that is more enduring. The liberty
protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons the right
to make this choice.”38
Lawrence, which constitutional scholar Laurence Tribe has
claimed “may well be remembered as the Brown v. Board of gay
and lesbian America,”39 thus may be the death knell of the Buck
approach.40 Indeed, as Justice O’Connor suggested in her
Lawrence concurring opinion, the application of the Texas antisodomy law as slander per se also improperly singles out
homosexuals as a class “for disfavored legal status” in violation of
the Equal Protection Clause, which “neither knows nor tolerates
classes among citizens.”41
Yet, some post-Lawrence courts have still applied preLawrence precedent without relying on a criminal foundation. In
February 2010, a Texas federal court denied a radio station’s
motion to dismiss allegations that it falsely branded the plaintiff as
“Henry the gay security guard.”42 The court held that under Texas
law, the “imputation of homosexuality might as a matter of fact

37

Id. at 566–67.
Id.
39
Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” that Dare Not
Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1894, 1895 (2004).
40
See Buck v. Savage, 323 S.W.2d 363, 376–77 (Tex. App. 1959).
41
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 584 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson,
163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
42
See Robinson v. Radio One, Inc., 695 F. Supp. 2d 425, 426 (N.D. Tex. 2010).
38
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expose a person to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule.”43
Although the court recognized that Lawrence limited prior Texas
defamation law, which, relying on the illegality of sodomy at the
time had held allegations of homosexuality were defamatory per
se, it avoided resolving the conflict. Instead, the Texas court
suggested that defamatory meaning was a question of fact and “a
complex [issue], ripe for the clarification that comes from allowing
litigation to proceed rather than the imposition of a single judge’s
view.”44
C. Defamation Per Se—Implying Unchastity or Exposing Plaintiff
to Public Hatred, Contempt, or Ridicule
While the continuing viability of the sodomy line of cases is
questionable post-Lawrence, other courts continue to find the false
imputation of homosexuality to be defamatory per se solely on the
grounds that it either implies unchastity, or has the tendency to
expose a person to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule.
Typically, implied unchastity claims concerned suggestions of
women having pre- or extra-marital sexual encounters with men.45
However, courts have expanded the category to include allegations
of female homosexual acts,46 and even suggested the theory could
apply to male homosexual acts.47 For example, in Schomer v.
Smidt,48 a 1980 California court upheld jury instructions charging
that “lesbianism implies unchastity and abnormal sexual
behavior.”49 In this case, the plaintiff, a flight attendant, alleged
43

See id. at 428.
Id. at 428 n.4.
45
See Bryson v. News Am. Publ’ns, Inc., 672 N.E.2d 1207 (Ill. 1996); Tonsmeire v.
Tonsmeire, 199 So. 2d 645, 648 (Ala. 1967); Webb v. Isensee, 166 P. 544 (Or. 1917).
46
See, e.g., Gallo v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane-Societa per Azioni, 585 F. Supp. 2d
520, 549 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); Wetherby v. Retail Credit Co., 201 A.2d 344 (Md. 1964); see
also Rejent v. Liberation Publ’ns, 611 N.Y.S.2d 866, 867 (App. Div. 1994); Palmisano v.
Modernismo Publ’ns, Ltd., 470 N.Y.S.2d 196 (App. Div. 1993); Guccione v. Hustler
Magazine, Inc., No. 80AP-375, 1981 WL 3516 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 8, 1981).
47
Gallo, 585 F. Supp. 2d 549 (“[I]mputation of homosexuality can—at least when
directed to a man married to a woman—be deemed every bit as offensive as imputing
unchastity to a woman.”).
48
170 Cal. Rptr. 662 (Ct. App. 1980), disapproved on other grounds by Miller v.
Nestande, 237 Cal. Rptr. 359 (Ct. App. 1987).
49
Schomer, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 664.
44
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that a pilot had told others he saw her engaging in sexual relations
with another woman.50 The court, while noting that sexual conduct
between consenting adults was legal in California, nonetheless
stated that “despite the sexual revolution and the freedom of action
and expression now extant, there is a distinction which must be
drawn between proper, moral and legal conduct,” such that “a
homosexual or heterosexual act could be proper, legal, and
questionably ‘moral.’”51 Thus, an imputation of “want of chastity”
the court found, could cause others to think less of the plaintiff and
subject the plaintiff to serious reputational harm.52 As a result, the
court concluded that the statement was slanderous per se.53
However, noting the changing perceptions toward chastity in
contemporary society, a commentator in a leading defamation
treatise added that: “Many adult American women might well
consider it more harmful to be called ‘unchased’ than ‘unchaste,’
the common law to the contrary notwithstanding.”54
Meanwhile, other courts hold that a false imputation of
homosexuality as defamatory per se tends to expose a person to
public hatred, contempt, or ridicule.55 Indeed, many New York

50

Id. at 663.
Id. at 666.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
SACK, supra note 6, § 2.4.4.
55
Manale v. City of New Orleans, Dep’t of Police, 673 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1982);
Thomas v. BET Sound-Stage Restaurant/Brettco, Inc., 61 F. Supp. 2d 448, 457 (D. Md.
1999) (holding that all elements of defamation under Maryland law met when falsely
calling woman a lesbian); Switzer v. Rivera, 174 F. Supp. 2d 1097, 1110 (D. Nev. 2001)
(holding that the statements at issue were defamatory per se to the extent that they were
made in the workplace, but granting summary judgment to defendants for plaintiff’s
failure to prove defamation occurred); see also Klepetko v. Reisman, 839 N.Y.S.2d 101,
102–03 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2007); Niconovich v. Tullet & Tokyo Forex, 685 N.Y.S.2d
17 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1999); Bohdan v. Alltool Mfg., Co., 411 N.W.2d 902 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1987) (holding that employees of defendant company defamed plaintiff by falsely
stating or implying he was a homosexual); Q-Tone Broad., Co. v. Musicradio of Md., No.
93C-09-021, 1994 Del. Super. LEXIS 453, at *23 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 22, 1994)
(holding that while the imputation of homosexuality alone is insufficient to support an
action for slander per se, comments which suggested that the plaintiff was a homosexual
who propositioned his male clients maligned the plaintiff’s professional conduct and
were therefore sufficient to support the plaintiff’s prima facie case of slander per se).
51
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courts have traditionally followed this theory.56 For example, a
New York appellate court ruled in 1984 that statements by a
singing group about a husband and wife were libelous on their
face. In Matherson v. Marchello,57 a singing group, in a broadcast
interview, suggested that both the husband and wife engaged in
same-sex relationships outside of their marriage. As to a comment
by the singing group about the husband’s “boyfriend,” the court
rejected the defendant’s argument that no social stigma should
attach.58
“It cannot be said that social opprobrium of
homosexuality does not remain with us today,” the court wrote.59
“Rightly or wrongly, many individuals still view homosexuality as
immoral . . . . In short, despite the fact that an increasing number of
homosexuals are publicly expressing satisfaction and even pride in
their status, the potential and probable harm of a false charge of
homosexuality, in terms of social and economic impact, cannot be
ignored.”60
More recently, in the 2008 case of Gallo v. Alitalia-Linee
Aeree Italiane-Societa per Azioni,61 a New York federal court
found slander per se where the defendant told the plaintiff’s wife
that the plaintiff was a homosexual and had had an affair with
another male employee.62 The court reasoned that, under New
York law, slander per se applied “because certain people view
homosexuality as particularly reprehensible and immoral

56

While New York’s highest court has never weighed in on the issue, numerous trial
and intermediate appellate courts have found the imputation of homosexuality to be
defamatory or slanderous per se under New York law. See, e.g., Moye v. Gary, 595 F.
Supp. 738, 740 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (“Some New York courts have held that words
constitute slander per se if they impute homosexual behavior.”); Tourge v. City of
Albany, 727 N.Y.S.2d 753 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001); Privitera v. Town of Phelps, 435
N.Y.S.2d 402 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981), abrogated on other grounds by Liberman v.
Gelstein, 605 N.E.2d 344 (N.Y. 1992); Nowark v. Maguire, 255 N.Y.S.2d 318 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1964). But see Stein v. Trager, 232 N.Y.S.2d 362 (N.Y. App. Div. 1962)
(holding that an alleged statement by the defendant that the plaintiff was a homosexual
was not slanderous per se, since it did not charge the plaintiff with a punishable crime).
57
473 N.Y.S.2d 998 (App. Div. 1984).
58
Id. at 1005.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
585 F. Supp. 2d 520 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
62
Id. at 551.
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conduct.”63 While the court recognized that “many in our society
no longer hold such beliefs, and that gay and lesbian persons have
achieved many civil rights that were once denied them due to their
status,” the decision was “based on the fact that the prejudice gays
and lesbians experience is real and sufficiently widespread so that
it would be premature to declare victory.”64 Yet, in reaching its
decision, the court noted that “if the degree of this widespread
prejudice disappears, this Court welcomes the red flag that will
attach to this decision.”65
D. Capable of Defamatory Meaning, Requiring Proof of Damages
The vast majority of recent decisions have found that the
imputation of homosexuality is not per se defamatory, yet that it
does meet the basic defamatory threshold—a tendency to lower the
plaintiff in the eyes of his or her community—thereby requiring
the plaintiff to prove that the false statement caused damage.66 The
degree to which a plaintiff must prove damage varies, with some
courts requiring him or her to show as little as loss of social
standing or reputation, and others requiring proof of economic
damages.67 For example, one court allowed a plaintiff to cite as

63

Id. at 549.
Id. at 549–50.
65
Id. at 550.
66
See, e.g., Greenly v. Sara Lee Corp., No. CIV. S-06-1775(WBS)(EFB), 2008 WL
1925230, at *8 n.15 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2008); Doe I v. Individuals, 561 F. Supp. 2d 249
(D. Conn. 2008); Smith v. Mission Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 225 F. Supp. 2d 1293 (D. Kan.
2002); Regehr v. Sonopress, Inc., No. 2:99CV690K, 2000 WL 33710902, at *4 (D. Utah
Apr. 14, 2000); Thomas v. Bet Sound-Stage Restaurant/BrettCo, Inc., 61 F. Supp. 2d 448
(D. Md. 1999); see also Gray v. Press Commc’n, LLC, 775 A.2d 678 (N.J. App. Div.
2001); Stokes v. Meimaris, 675 N.E.2d 1289 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996); Donovan v. Fiumara,
442 S.E.2d 524 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994); Hayes v. Smith, 832 P.2d 1022, 1023–25 (Colo.
App. 1991); Bohdan v. Alltool Mfg. Co., 411 N.W.2d 902 (Minn. App. 1987); Moricoli
v. Schwartz, 361 N.E.2d 74 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977); Anson v. Paxson Commc’n Corp., 736
So. 2d 1209 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999); Boehm v. Am. Bankers Ins. Grp., Inc., 557
So. 2d 91, 94 n.1 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990); Nazeri v. Missouri Valley College, 860
S.W.2d 303 (Mo. 1993) (en banc); Miskovsky v. Tulsa Tribune Co., 678 P.2d 242 (Okla.
1983); Key v. Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. & Corr., 598 N.E.2d 207 (Ohio Ct. Cl. 1990); Trice
v. Burress, 137 P.3d 1253, 1257 n.7 (Okla. Civ. App. 2006); Morrissette v. Beatte, 17
A.2d 464 (R.I. 1941).
67
Compare with Hayes, 832 P.2d at 1024–25 (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323, 350 (1974) (suggesting that injury is not limited to monetary loss, but can be
64
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damage the fact that a same-sex co-worker propositioned him in
response to false statements about his sexuality.68 In another case,
a plaintiff met her burden of proving damages by testifying that
she experienced embarrassment and humiliation when her exhusband falsely told her colleagues that she was having a lesbian
relationship.69
A much-cited 1991 Colorado appellate case declined to hold
that statements regarding homosexuality were within the per se
categories.70 In Hayes v. Smith,71 two individuals told a teacher’s
supervisor that she was homosexual.72 In concluding that the
statement should not be classified as slander per se, the court noted
several important factors, including the fact that proof of economic
and reputational damage was less daunting than in earlier times
due to the availability of expert testimony from economists,
psychologists, and other experts.
The court also distinguished between statements about
homosexuality and statements about other standard per se
activities, noting that:
if a person is falsely accused of belonging to a
category of persons considered deserving of social
[condemnation], i.e., thief, murderer, prostitute, etc.,
it is generally the court’s determination as to
whether such accusation is considered slander per
se so that damages are presumed. A court should
not classify homosexuals with those miscreants who
have engaged in actions that deserve the reprobation
or scorn which is implicitly a part of the
slander/libel per se classifications.73

shown by emotional and reputational damage as well)) with Glazer v. Lamkin, 506
N.W.2d 570, 572–73 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996).
68
Smith v. Mission Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 225 F. Supp. 2d 1293, 1304 (D. Kan. 2002).
69
Stokes v. Meimaris, 675 N.E.2d 1289, 1295 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996).
70
Hayes v. Smith, 832 P.2d 1022, 1024 (Colo. App. 1991).
71
832 P.2d 1022 (Colo. App. 1991).
72
Id. at 1023.
73
Id. at 1025 (citation omitted).
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The court further noted that social attitudes toward gays were
mixed and that no evidence in the case suggested “homosexuals
are held by society in such poor esteem.”74
Still other courts considering imputations of homosexuality
require a heightened showing of damages, such that a plaintiff
must prove “special damages,” i.e., proof of economic harm
separate from emotional distress.75 In 1994, the North Carolina
Court of Appeals, in Donovan v. Fiumara,76 held that referring to
two women as “gay and bisexual” was not slander absent proof of
special damages.77 The court reasoned that being homosexual
itself was not a crime, and therefore was not per se slanderous
because the conduct proscribed by state law making “a crime
against nature, with mankind or beast” a felony was not necessarily
implicated by the terms “gay” or “lesbian.”78 Indeed, the court
added, homosexuality or bisexuality does not necessarily connote
sexual activity at all, but rather an “inclination” or “preference.”79
II. CHANGING PERCEPTIONS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
After the Supreme Court’s groundbreaking decision in
Lawrence, and in light of the changing attitudes in society towards
homosexuality, a growing number of federal courts have adopted
the rationale that the false imputation of homosexuality can be
defamatory is no longer sustainable.80 To a certain extent, the
74

Id. But see Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623–24 (1996) (striking down
Amendment 2 of the Colorado State Constitution, which “prohibit[ed] all legislative,
executive or judicial action at any level of state or local government designed to protect .
. . homosexual persons” as violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution).
75
See, e.g., Miskovsky v. Tulsa Tribune Co., 678 P.2d 242 (Okla. 1983); Trice v.
Burress, 137 P.3d 1253, 1257 n.7 (Okla. Civ. App. 2006); Wilson v. Harvey, 842 N.E.2d
83 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005); Donovan v. Fiumara, 442 S.E.2d 572 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994);
Hayes 832 P.2d at 1022; Moricoli v. Schwartz, 361 N.E.2d 74, 76 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977).
76
442 S.E.2d 572 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994).
77
Id. at 576.
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Albright v. Morton, 321 F. Supp. 2d 130 (D. Mass. 2004), aff’d sub nom. Amrak
Prods., Inc. v. Morton, 410 F.3d 69 (1st Cir. 2005); see also Murphy v. Millennium
Radio Grp., LLC, Civil Action No. 08-1743(JAP), 2010 WL 1372408, at *7 (D.N.J. Mar.
31, 2010); Stern v. Cosby, 645 F. Supp. 2d 258, 273–76 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
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Lawrence decision was presaged by some defamation courts. In a
pre-Lawrence decision out of the Southern District of New York,
in a case without an allegation of homosexuality, the court
discussed the common law per se categories and suggested, sua
sponte, that under New York law, the defamatory implication of
homosexuality “in twenty-first century Manhattan amounts to little
more than an historical oddity.”81 Indeed, a few years later, the
same court noted in dicta that the “welcome shifts in social
perceptions of homosexuality” call into question the entire line of
New York precedent holding the imputation of homosexuality is
per se defamatory.82
Taking a more direct approach, in 2004, a Massachusetts
federal district court, applying Massachusetts law, questioned
whether a false statement that an individual is gay is capable of a
defamatory meaning, although the discussion is arguably dicta. In
Albright v. Morton,83 the plaintiff complained that his
miscaptioned photograph in a book about the singer Madonna
created the erroneous impression that he was gay. Although it
ruled that the photograph and accompanying text did not actually
suggest that the plaintiff was gay—and thus was not defamatory—
the court nevertheless chose to address the question of whether an
actual false statement that an individual is gay could be
defamatory, at least using the per se approach.
“Looking at any ‘considerable and respectable class of the
community’ in this day and age,” the court wrote, “I cannot
conclude that identifying someone as a homosexual discredits him,
that the statement fits within the category of defamation per se.”84
The Albright court reasoned that per se allegations of
homosexuality, like the sodomy statutes overturned in Lawrence,
“demean[] the lives of homosexual persons” and so too, the court

81
Dellefave v. Access Temporaries, Inc., No. 99 CIV. 6098(RWS), 2001 WL 25745 at
*4, n.1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan 10, 2001).
82
Lewittes v. Cohen, No. 03 Civ. 189(CSH), 2004 WL 1171261, at *3 n.5 (S.D.N.Y.
May 26, 2004) (disposing case on statute of limitations issue).
83
321 F. Supp. 2d 130 (D. Mass. 2004).
84
Id. at 136.
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reasoned, did application of the per se rule to allegations of
homosexuality.85
The court acknowledged that bias against gay individuals
persists, sometimes driven by religious or ethical convictions, but
wrote that “[p]rivate biases may be outside the reach of the law,
but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect.”86 The
court noted that if it “were to agree that calling someone a
homosexual is defamatory per se—it would, in effect, validate that
sentiment and legitimize relegating homosexuals to second-class
status.”87
The court’s opinion also referred to the racial
misidentification cases and drew an analogy between those cases
and Albright.88 In 2005, the First Circuit affirmed the opinion in
Albright on the grounds that the photograph failed to impute
homosexuality, and declined further opinion as to whether such
imputation constitutes defamation in Massachusetts.89
Following the logic of Albright, in a 2009 case, Stern v.
Cosby,90 the United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York rejected plaintiff Howard K. Stern’s claim, and a
long line of New York precedent, that being called gay was
defamatory per se under New York law.91 Stern, a former
companion of the late celebrity-socialite Anna Nicole Smith,
claimed that he was defamed by passages in a book written by
television host Rita Cosby. The book suggested that Stern had oral
sex with a man at a party, and also that he and others watched
pornographic videos of himself having sex with other men.92 Stern
argued that the statements were defamatory per se under New York
law because they exposed him to public hatred and ridicule.93
85

Id. at 137 (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003)); see also Greenly v.
Sara Lee Corp., No. CIV. S-06-1775(WBS)(EFB), 2008 WL 1925230, at *8 (E.D. Cal.
Apr. 30, 2008) (holding that characterizing the imputation of homosexuality as slander
per se demeans the lives of homosexual persons).
86
Albright, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 138 (quoting Palmore v. Sidoti, 446 U.S. 429, 433
(1984)).
87
Id.
88
Id. at 138–39.
89
Amrak Prods., Inc. v. Morton, 410 F.3d 69, 73 (1st Cir. 2005).
90
645 F. Supp. 2d 258 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
91
Id. at 273, 276.
92
Id. at 267, 281 (alleging other defamatory statements unrelated to Stern’s sexuality).
93
Id. at 273.
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Rejecting Stern’s arguments, Judge Denny Chin noted that “the
past few decades have seen a veritable sea change in social
attitudes about homosexuality.”94 The court echoed the growing
sentiment that the Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence had
“foreclosed such reliance” on older, per se precedent.95 The court
added that “in 2009, the ‘current of contemporary public opinion’
does not support the notion that New Yorkers view gays and
lesbians as shameful or odious.”96 As evidence, the court pointed
to the movement in the state to legalize gay marriage and to a 2009
New York public opinion poll in which the majority
overwhelmingly supported some form of government recognition
of same-sex relationships.97 Moreover, the court relied on the New
York Court of Appeals’ recent ruling holding that the right of gay
marriage was not implicitly found in the state constitution, but that
the legislature was not foreclosed to establish it.98 The Stern court
pointed to the plurality opinion of New York’s highest court
finding that social attitudes towards gay and lesbian New Yorkers
had changed dramatically over the years.99 Finally, the Stern court
reasoned that because the New York Court of Appeals had never
ruled on the issue, it was not bound by the older line of cases that
conclusively held that imputation of homosexuality was
defamation per se; yet the court declined to either discuss the issue
in depth or contemplate the “evolving social attitudes regarding
homosexuality.”100 Judge Chin concluded that “[w]hile I certainly
agree that gays and lesbians continue to face prejudice, I
respectfully disagree that the existence of this continued prejudice
leads to the conclusion that there is a widespread view of gays and
lesbians as contemptible and disgraceful. Moreover, the fact of
such prejudice on the part of some does not warrant a judicial

94

Id.
Id. at 274.
96
Id.
97
Id.
98
Id. (citing Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 8 (N.Y. 2006) (“[T]he idea that
same-sex marriage is even possible is a relatively new one.”)).
99
Id. at 273–74.
100
Id. at 275.
95
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holding that gays and lesbians, merely because of their sexual
orientation, belong in the same class as criminals.”101
Recently, in the 2010 case of Murphy v. Millennium Radio
Group LLC,102 a New Jersey federal court also found that “the
assertion that someone is homosexual is not defamatory.”103
Murphy was hired to take photographs of two male radio shockjocks for the cover of a magazine that depicted the men posing
nude behind their radio station’s logo.104 The station encouraged
listeners to submit digitally manipulated versions of the photo, and
Murphy in turn accused the station of encouraging copyright
infringement. In response, the radio hosts made on-air statements
about Murphy’s business practices, as well as allegations that they
“inferred [he] was a homosexual.”105
While the court found the statements were rhetorical hyperbole
and did not convey a defamatory meaning, the court also held that
to the extent the statements implied that Murphy was homosexual,
they were not reasonably susceptible to defamatory meaning.106 In
support, the court cited a 2006 New Jersey Supreme Court case
finding an equal protection violation by the state’s denial of rights
and benefits to committed same-sex couples that were given to
their heterosexual counterparts.107 Following that decision’s
reasoning, the Murphy court embraced the notion that “[t]imes and
attitudes have changed, and there has been a developing
understanding that discrimination against gays and lesbians is no
longer acceptable in this State,” and noted that New Jersey had
recently legally recognized same-sex domestic partnerships.108
101
Id. While holding that the statements were not defamatory per se, the court
nonetheless held that they were susceptible of defamatory meaning—but not because the
statement alleged that Stern was gay. Rather, the court reasoned that a “reasonable jury
could find that engaging in oral sex at a party is shameful or contemptible,” regardless of
the sex of the other individual, and that making a sex tape with any individual “would
expose Stern to contempt among most people—even if, arguably, not among the social
circles in which he . . . traveled.” Id.
102
Civil Action No. 08-1743(JAP), 2010 WL 1372408 (D.N.J. Mar. 31, 2010).
103
Id. at *7.
104
Id. at *1.
105
Id. at *2.
106
Id. at *7.
107
Id. (citing Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006)).
108
Id. (quoting Harris, 908 A.2d at 209).
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Thus, given the evolution of the societal landscape, the Murphy
court found that it “appears unlikely that the New Jersey Supreme
Court would legitimize discrimination against gays and lesbians by
concluding that referring to someone as homosexual ‘tends so to
harm the reputation of that person as to lower him in the estimation
of the community as to deter third persons from associating or
dealing with him.’”109 Consequently, the court denied Murphy’s
defamation claim as a matter of law, holding that statements
implying he was homosexual were not defamatory at all.110
III. NORMATIVITY AND DEFAMATORY MEANING
The future viability of defamation suits based on imputations
of homosexuality is still uncertain. Although there appear to be
fewer recent decisions willing to place an allegation of
homosexuality within the “criminal” or “unchastity” categories of
per se defamation, plaintiffs are not barred from trying to establish
claims with a showing of special damages. More courts seem to be
taking judicial notice of changing social attitudes toward
alternative sexualities, although only a handful have entirely
repudiated the notion that calling someone gay defames that
individual.111
Social attitudes are of course changing. A number of polls
have documented the increasing public acceptance of gay lifestyles
and gay rights. For example, a 2007 Gallup poll found “public
tolerance for gay rights at the high-water mark of attitudes
recorded over the past three decades.”112 Although the poll still
found considerable opposition to gay marriage, on the issue of
whether homosexuality was an acceptable lifestyle, 57% of
respondents said they believed it was, which Gallup described as

109

Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977) (“A communication is
defamatory if it tends so to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the
estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with
him.”)).
110
Id. at *7–8.
111
See Part II.
112
Lydia Saad, Tolerance for Gay Rights at High-Water Mark, GALLUP (May 29,
2007), http://www.gallup.com/poll/27694/tolerance-gay-rights-highwater-mark.aspx.
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“the highest on record for this measure.”113 A 2006 poll by the
Pew Research Center for the People & the Press similarly found
declines in the number of Americans opposing gay marriage, gay
adoption, and open military service by gays.114 A 2009 Gallup poll
also found a shift, even among conservatives, toward favoring
openly gay service members: “The findings show that majorities of
weekly churchgoers (60%), conservatives (58%), and Republicans
(58%),” favored the end of the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” law,115
which was repealed by Congress and signed by President Obama
in December 2010.116 All of this empirical evidence strongly
suggests that public attitudes are evolving.
Given the data and the recent caselaw, one might surmise that
defamation doctrine is in the gradual process of responding
appropriately to social changes. Defamation is, after all, the
“social tort,” and the proper scope of defamatory meaning must
move with changes in social attitudes. But is the doctrinal change,
slow though it may be, truly sufficient?
This Article proposes a different and more comprehensive
solution. Regardless of the shifting winds of public sentiment, this
Article suggests that courts should reject the conclusion that
imputations of homosexuality are defamatory. They should do so
on the same grounds as the racial misidentification cases: public
policy should not permit the law to symbolically endorse
discriminatory attitudes or conduct, even if such attitudes are
common.
Our proposal suggests that common-law defamation doctrine
should be fundamentally rethought to reflect the more egalitarian
age of today and the courts’ more enlightened views on
homosexuality in other legal contexts. Indeed, this proposal would

113

Id.
Less Opposition to Gay Marriage, Adoption and Military Service, PEW RESEARCH
CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS (May 22, 2006), http://peoplepress.org/report/273/less-opposition-to-gay-marriage-adoption-and-military-service.
115
Lymari Morales, Conservatives Shift in Favor of Openly Gay Service Members,
GALLUP (June 5, 2009), http://www.gallup.com/poll/120764/conservatives-shift-favoropenly-gay-service-members.aspx.
116
Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-321 (2010) (repealing
10 U.S.C. § 654 (2006)).
114
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affect cases involving imputations of homosexuality, but it would
also have implications for other defamation cases where unjustly
discriminatory views are at issue. This Article proposes that courts
draw a sharp distinction between defamatory statements that refer
to some immutable characteristic or involuntary status of an
individual versus those statements that refer to some voluntary
misconduct or malfeasance. Courts should hold that statements or
inferences about immutable characteristic references are nondefamatory as a matter of law, regardless of a judge’s or a jury’s
sense of how the Restatement’s “substantial and respectable”
group of so-called right-thinking citizens would view a statement.
Thus, a statement that reflected discriminatory attitudes toward
someone’s racial or ethnic background, sexual orientation,
mental117 or physical illness or disability, or other immutable
characteristic should not be treated as carrying defamatory
meaning, even if, in fact, a significant segment of society would
endorse such discriminatory views.
The justification for this restructuring of doctrine starts with
the recognition that the Anglo-American common law of
defamation carries with it vestiges of a very different, less
egalitarian society than we find ourselves in today.118 Small
117

For an interesting analysis of defamation and mental illness, see Karen M. Markin,
Still Crazy After All These Years: The Enduring Defamatory Power of Mental Disorder,
29 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 155 (2005).
118
See, e.g., LAWRENCE MCNAMARA, REPUTATION AND DEFAMATION 73–74 (2007).
McNamara notes that in ecclesiastical courts in England, defamation was intertwined
with social control:
The control dimension of the law is reflected first in the benchmark
standard of “good and serious men.” It was by definition acceptable
under the law to speak ill of a person who was not of good fame
“among good and serious men.” The meaning of the phrase “good
and serious men” is never discussed in the literature or cases, but
there is never any doubt expressed about what it might mean. Those
who were thought of as “of no account” or “not of good fame”
included the “underclass [of the poor and lawbreakers] who would
rendezvous in taverns and other gathering places.” Exclusion served
to maintain the social order. Hanawalt notes that the processes of
marginalization in medieval England “were as important in
establishing boundaries as were those that elevated and enclosed the
space around the elite.” Social control and exclusion are based on the
equating of social standing and moral goodness; that is, power
defines virtue.
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wonder, then, that the mechanisms for determining harm to
reputation are deficient—they evolved without a nuanced grasp of
social discrimination and its harms. Defamation doctrine’s origin
precedes our current, more sophisticated understanding of how we
should make social evaluations of persons. The fact that the
common law has perpetuated these atavistic understandings is not
sound reason to follow those rules, stare decisis notwithstanding.
As Justice Holmes put it,
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of
law than that so it was laid down in the time of
Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds
upon which it was laid down have vanished long
since, and the rule simply persists from blind
imitation of the past.119
The common law of defamation has assumed social inequality
built into its very DNA—the assumption that certain people, by
their very essence, are either superior or inferior. People’s inherent
characteristics were, in the not-so-distant past, a marker for their
place in the social hierarchy—the prejudices of the “culturally
superior” class are inevitably reflected in legal doctrine touching
upon personal reputation.120
Only through a fundamental
restructuring of how we think about defamatory meaning can we
expunge this atavistic worldview from our legal doctrine. The
groundwork of such a restructuring was laid in Hayes v. Smith,121
discussed earlier,122 which recognized the unfairness of placing
imputations of homosexuality into the same (per se) category as “a
person falsely accused of belonging to a category of persons
considered deserving of social [condemnation], i.e., thief,
murderer, prostitute, etc. . . . A Court should not classify
homosexuals with those miscreants who have engaged in actions

Id. (citations omitted).
119
Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897).
120
See, e.g., Wolfe v. Georgia R. & E. Co., 58 S.E. 899, 901 (Ga. App. 1907) (“It is a
matter of common knowledge, that, viewed from a social standpoint, the negro race is in
mind and moral inferior to the Caucasian. The record of each from the dawn of historic
time denies equality.”).
121
Hayes v. Smith, 832 P.2d 1022 (Colo. App. 1991).
122
See supra Part I.D.
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that deserve . . . reprobation or scorn . . . .”123 Hayes, of course,
only addressed whether imputations of homosexuality should be
categorized as defamatory per se—our suggestion is that
imputations involving immutable characteristics or involuntary
status should not be recognized as carrying any defamatory
meaning whatsoever.124
Commentators have long recognized this fundamental flaw in
the law’s evaluation of defamatory meaning, although most appear
to have simply accepted the status quo. Consider, for example,
Dean Prosser’s statement that “[a] defamatory communication
usually has been defined as one which tends to hold the plaintiff up
to hatred, contempt or ridicule, or to cause him to be shunned or
avoided. This definition is certainly too narrow, since an
imputation of insanity, or poverty, or an assertion that a woman
has been raped, which would be likely to arouse only pity or
sympathy in the minds of all decent people, have been held to be
defamatory.”125 Our contention is that, regardless of how decent
people would react, these are exactly the kinds of statements that
the law, as a matter of policy, should not recognize as carrying any
defamatory meaning. They are statements that refer not to some
voluntary wrong-doing or illegal course of conduct, but to an
individual’s unavoidable—and sometimes unfortunate—status.
The problem is not simply that, as Prosser put it, the standard
definition of a defamatory communication is “too narrow.”126 The
problem is that the standard definition recognizes as defamatory
statements that stigmatize innocent classes of persons and thus
perpetuate and approve that stigma.
Within certain narrow domains, such as racial
misidentification, courts have recognized the problem as well.
Consider Polygram Records, Inc. v. Superior Court,127 a 1985
California appellate decision. In Polygram, comedian Robin
Williams and several media companies were sued for defamation
by a wine maker after Williams recorded a joke which, the maker
123
124
125
126
127

Hayes, 832 P.2d at 1025.
See supra Part I.D.
WILLIAM L. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 739 (4th ed. 1971) (citations omitted).
Id.
216 Cal. Rptr. 252 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
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contended, associated its wine with African-Americans.128
Williams’ routine focused on a “Black” wine, “Rege” (or
“Reggie”) that unlike red or white wine, “goes with fish, meat, any
damn thing it wants to.”129 Apparently unbeknownst to Williams,
there was an actual “Rege” wine company, which filed suit.130 As
part of its defamation claim, Rege argued that the comedy routine
associated its wine with African-Americans, “allegedly ‘a socioeconomic group of persons commonly considered to be the
antithesis of wine connoisseurs,’ who ‘harbor obviously
unsophisticated tastes in wines.’”131
The California court rejected this argument as “utterly
untenable.”132 Even assuming the joke conveyed that sentiment,
the court wrote, “he could not recover damages based upon a
theory that his wine had been disparaged by association with a
particular racial or ethnic group, or a segment thereof. Courts will
not condone theories of recovery which promote or effectuate
discriminatory conduct.”133 The California court cited Palmore v.
Sidoti,134 in which the U.S. Supreme Court overturned a Florida
decision denying custody of a three-year-old to her mother because
the mother had remarried an African-American man and the
mixed-race marriage would cause social stigma to be visited upon
the child.135 The Court, noting that a denial of custody was clearly
state action subject to the Equal Protection Clause, ruled that
judges could not, under the Constitution, consider such alleged
stigma in a custody case.136 “Private biases may be outside the
reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give
them effect,” the Court wrote137 in a sentence later quoted in the

128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137

Id. at 254.
Id.
Id. at 253.
Id. at 261.
Id.
Id.
466 U.S. 429 (1984).
Id. at 433.
Id. at 433–34.
Id. at 433.
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Albright case, which itself found that defamation per se “demeans
the lives of homosexual persons.”138
Although Polygram Records does not explicitly anticipate the
breadth of our proposal, the California court’s reasoning is
certainly consistent with the direction in which we would like to
see the law go. Whether or not a determination of defamatory
meaning is state action implicating the Equal Protection Clause,139
as the Polygram case seemed to suggest, defamation doctrine
would benefit from a deeper consideration of the equality effects of
its rules. The issue of defamatory meaning is in most jurisdictions
based in the common law, which regularly consults public policy
implications in shaping doctrine. The Restatement’s reference to
anti-social groups, whose views courts should reject,140 implicitly
endorses this role of public policy in shaping the normative
boundaries of defamatory meaning, although the law has yet to
come to grips with the full implications of the problem.141
The argument that important social goals should at times
outweigh legitimate reputational harm is consistent, of course, with
numerous public policy-based defenses already recognized in libel
doctrine. Various privileges, for example, allow defamation to
take place in light of important reasons supporting the privilege.
Absolute privileges against defamation liability granted to judges,
legislators, and executive officials,142 for example, protect the
important social interest of these officials carrying out their official
duties without fear of ruinous defamation suits.143 Various
qualified privileges for speaking in the public interest—including a

138

Albright v. Morton, 321 F. Supp. 2d 130, 137 (D. Mass. 2004) (quoting Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003)). Justice Scalia, however, appears to disagree. In his
vigorous dissent to Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), a case in which the Supreme
Court overturned a Colorado referendum denying equal protection to homosexuals, he
cited pre-Lawrence precedent and argued that “[i]f it is constitutionally permissible for a
State to make homosexual conduct criminal, surely it is constitutionally permissible for a
State to enact other laws merely disfavoring homosexual conduct.” Id. at 641.
139
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
140
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 cmt. e (1977).
141
See Lidsky, supra note 14, at 9 (arguing that public policy choices obscured by
defamation doctrine should be addressed explicitly by courts).
142
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 585, 590–91 (1977).
143
SACK, supra note 6, § 2.8.2.
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privilege granted to the press144—similarly recognize the principle
that compensating defamatory harms must sometimes give way to
important policy considerations.
Our proposal is also consistent with the constitutional
revolution in libel law begun by New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.145
Prior to Sullivan, most courts had essentially ignored the harm to
First Amendment interests that state-driven libel doctrine had
created.146 Sullivan and its progeny recognized that free speech
interests sometimes must be vindicated even in the face of real
reputational harms. The “profound national commitment to the
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust,
and wide-open”147 simply trumps the reputational interests of
certain classes of libel plaintiffs. In the same way, our proposal
suggests that equality interests must at times trump even genuine
defamatory harms when the statements giving rise to liability
compel the law to give its approval to discriminatory and unjustly
stigmatizing social views.
There are of course interests that counsel against this shift in
doctrine. Particularly in more socially conservative areas of the
country, individuals may in fact suffer reputational harm because
of imputations of homosexuality or other immutable
characteristics. Social relationships may be damaged; careers may
be affected. Not only that, but, as Professor Lidsky points out, “it
rewards the defamer by giving him license to defame again.”148
There are no easy answers, yet there are powerful reasons to
consider change in the legal status quo.
The imprimatur of the law is a powerful symbolic force that
normalizes certain social understandings.149 Basing legal decisions
on discriminatory beliefs and behaviors, whether in libel law or
child custody cases, validates those beliefs and behaviors. There
144

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 594 (1977).
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
146
See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright’s
Constitutionality, 112 YALE L.J. 1, 26–27 (2002).
147
N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 270.
148
Lidsky, supra note 14, at 23.
149
See id. at 40 (arguing that “defamation’s symbolic functions often take precedence
over its instrumental ones”).
145
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must come a time when the law no longer recognizes atavistic and
discriminatory social views as indispensible ingredients in legal
doctrine.150 That time, we believe, is now.
CONCLUSION
Imputation of homosexuality cases present an interesting
challenge for courts as social understandings of gay individuals
evolve. A status that was once regarded as criminal in nature has
come to mean something quite different to many citizens in the
early part of the twenty-first century. The process by which courts
account for such changes in social attitudes is an important aspect
of the study of defamation law. Although the law appears to be in
a state of flux, this Article has suggested that courts should
seriously consider whether to give legal effect to discriminatory
views in a way that legitimizes and validates them.
Our proposal suggests that courts decline to recognize as
defamatory statements that stigmatize a class of persons based on
some immutable characteristic or involuntary status. As one court
put it, courts should not “condone theories of recovery which
promote or effectuate discriminatory conduct.”151 Although this
proposal has definite costs, it has the decided advantage of
removing the imprimatur of the law from regressive and
stigmatizing social attitudes.

150

See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (overturning Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) which had upheld racial segregation as constitutional).
151
Polygram Records, Inc. v. Superior Court, 216 Cal. Rptr. 252, 261 (Cal. Ct. App.
1985).

